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I. INTRODUCTION
The eight-year presidential administration of George W. Bush' was
not a celebrated one for supporters of progressive American
multilateralism. Internationalists around the world cringed in 2003,
when following a cabinet meeting President Bush sardonically
responded to a press question about the application of international law
with feigned concern: "International law? I better call my lawyer." 2 it
was an unscripted but defining moment that critics have pointed to as
symptomatic of the Bush administration's confrontational style of
foreign policy which has been succinctly summarized as "spiteful
unilateralism.
The 2008 election of Barack Obama to the presidency has been
widely expected to result in significant change for the foreign policy of
the United States. President Obama has been described as a politician
with "clear instinct toward idealism" and an "equally apparent devotion
to pragmatism;" indeed, one observer has lauded Obama's political
style as "pragmatic idealism at its best."5 Critics have generally
agreed-but in less glowing terms-and have preferred to characterize
the style as an unlikely marriage of two erstwhile intellectual enemies:
the liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson and the political
6
realism of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The details of how this
political style will ultimately shape the foreign relations of the United
States is uncertain, but after President Obama's April 2009 trip to
Europe, the early contours of what will inevitably be called the "Obama
Doctrine" began to take shape.7 At this early stage, it is clear that a
primary goal of the new administration is to restore American
leadership and credibility in the world through increased participation in
and acknowledgment of the benefits of diplomacy and collaborative

1. 2001-2009. For convenience, in this Article George W. Bush is referred to as
"President Bush" and his presidential administration is referred to as the "Bush administration."
None of these references refer to President George H. W. Bush or his four-year presidential
administration (1989-1993).
2. Special: Last Cabinet Meeting of 2003 (CNN television broadcast Dec. 11, 2003)
(transcript availableat http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0312/11/se.01 .html).
3. Editorial, BoomerangDiplomacy, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2003, at A36.
4. Editorial, The New Man, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 4, 2009, at 1.
5. John Waelti, Refreshing Change in Foreign Policy, MONROE TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009,
http://www.madison.com/tct/opinion/column/448736.
6. Kim R. Holmes, Op-Ed., 'We are All Realists Now': New Liberalism in Foreign
Policy, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A4.
7. Clive Crook, In Search of an Obama Doctrine, FIN. TIMEs (London), Apr. 20, 2009,
at 7; E.J. Dionne Jr., The Obama Doctrine, WASH. PosT, Apr. 16, 2009, at A21; Obama
Doctrine,ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs (Fla.), Apr. 20, 2009, at 2A.
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multilateralism. For example, President Obama told a European
audience:
[T]here have been times where America has shown arrogance
and been dismissive, even derisive.... So I've come to Europe
this week to renew our partnership, one in which America listens
and learns from our friends and allies, but where our friends and
allies bear their share of the burden. Together, we must forge
common solutions to our common problems. 8
While President Obama's approach to foreign affairs has been
criticized by conservatives as being "feckless," "weak," "naive,"
"powerless," "irresolute," "supine," and "spineless," 9 the Obama
attempt to hit the reset button on foreign affairs has clearly
reinvigorated American liberals and internationalists.' 0
The purpose of this Article is to evaluate the prospect of change
under the Obama administration in one specific area of American
foreign policy: the relationship between the United States and the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Part II provides a very brief
introduction to the jurisdiction and international legal status of the ICC,
a court that is still unfamiliar to the majority of Americans. The history
of the strained relationship between the United States and the ICC is
summarized in Part III. The longest section in this article, Part IV,
examines the major American objections to the ICC, and includes an
analysis of the validity of the concerns. Finally, Part V contains my
recommendations to the Obama administration as it reconsiders
America's approach to the ICC.'

8. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by President Obama
at Strasbourg Town Hall (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
office/Remarks-by-President-Obama-at-Strasbourg-Town-Hall.
9. Dionne, supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., Hendrik Hertzberg, The Obama Effect, NEW YORKER, June 22, 2009, at 25;
Marc Ginsberg, Obama's Foreign Policy: A Grand Century of Days-Light Years Away from
Bush, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amb-marcginsberg/obamas-foreign-policy-a-gb 192386.html; Fred Kaplan, Handshake Diplomacy,
SLATE, Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2216610.
11. Admittedly, I am a non-American national and therefore my recommendations may
be lightly regarded by some. However, I have both studied and taught in the United States, and
my advice is given with the preconceived notion that, above all other considerations, U.S.
foreign policy must promote American national interests, protect American nationals, and
comply with the U.S. Constitution.
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TO THE ICC

The ICC is a permanent international tribunal established by a
multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
("Rome Statute" or "Statute").12 After many years of preparation and a
five-week diplomatic conference that involved intense negotiations, the
Rome Statute was finalized on July 17, 1998.'1 Once the Rome Statute
was ratified by the requisite 60th state, 14 the ICC came into legal
existence on July 1, 2002. The Court sits at The Hague, Netherlands,15
and consists of an Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), 16 18 judges who are
and an
divided into Pre-TrialI Trial, and Appeals Chambers,
administrative Registry.1 8 The prosecutors and judges of the ICC are
elected by the body that oversees and ultimately controls the Court, the
Assembly of States Parties (ASP), which is comprised of a diplomatic
representative of each state that has joined the ICC by ratifying or
acceding to the Rome Statute.19 At this writing, 111 states have joined
the ICC, including the majority of U.S. allies.2
Presently, the ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, 21 all of which are defined in the
Statute 22 and elaborated upon in a supplemental Elements of Crimes
document.2 3 The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to natural persons;2 4
12. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex 11, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [as corrected by process-verbaux of Nov. 10, 1998; July 12, 1999;
Nov. 30, 1999; May 8, 2000; Jan. 17, 2001; and Jan. 16, 2002, amended June 10-11, 2010]
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
13. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443 (1999)
(describing the negotiations at the Rome Diplomatic Conference and the preparatory
background to the conference).
14. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 126(1).
15. Id. art. 3(1).
16. Id. art. 42.
17. Id. arts. 35-41.
18. Id. art. 43.
19. Id. art. 112.
20. An official list of ICC Member States and signatories of the Rome Statute is available
at http://tinyurl.com/n2d6mw (visited Jan. 9, 2010). Member States include all members of the
European Union, nearly all NATO countries, Mexico, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New
Zealand, all states in South America, and a number of African states. Non-Member States
include China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel, and most states in the Middle East.
21. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 5. The Statute also gives the Court prospective
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. This aspect of the Court's jurisdiction is discussed in
detail in Part III.C, infra.
22. Id. arts. 6-8.
23. Id. art. 9; Elements of Crimes, ICC Doc. No. ICC-ASP/l/3(part II-B) (adopted Sept.
9, 2002).
24. Rome Statute, supra note 12, arts. 1, 25(1).
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it cannot prosecute states, but an accused's status as a Head of State,
Head of Government, or other governmental or diplomatic official does
not exempt him or her from personal criminal responsibility under the
Statute.25
The ICC does not have "universal" jurisdiction over all natural
persons in the world, though such a proposal was advanced by some
delegations at the Rome Conference.2 6 Rather, the Court's potential
jurisdiction is limited to acts that are subject to the domestic criminal
jurisdictions of certain states. In most cases, the Court may only
exercise jurisdiction over a situation if both of the following criteria are
met: the alleged crime is subject to the domestic jurisdiction of a state
that accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC,2 7 in that either the alleged crime
is committed on the territory of the state, 28 or the alleged crime is
committed by a national of the state; 29 and the state is either unwilling
or unable to genuinely investigate and/or prosecute the accused itself.30
The second requirement reflects the Rome Statute's emphasis that
the jurisdiction of the ICC is "complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions":31 the ICC is intended to act as a type of "backstop" that
will only prosecute a case that the state(s) with jurisdiction cannot or
will not prosecute domestically.
Finally, there is one exception to the ICC's general jurisdictional
rules. The Rome Statute allows the Court to assume jurisdiction over a
case involving a situation that has been explicitly referred to the ICC by
a resolution of the United Nations Security Council (S.C.) made
pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.32 In such a
situation, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction regardless as to whether or
not the states with jurisdiction are members of the ICC or have
otherwise consented to the ICC's jurisdiction. However, in such a
situation, the states with jurisdiction retain the right to carry out
domestic prosecutions and thereby exclude the commencement of ICC
proceedings.

25.
26.

Id. art. 27.
David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International CriminalCourt, 93 AM. J.

INT'L L. 12, 17-18 (1999).

27. A state that ratifies the Rome Statute becomes a member of the ICC and thereby
accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC. Non-member states may also choose to accept the
jurisdiction of the ICC in a given situation. See Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 12.
28. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
29. Id. art. 12(2)(b).
30. Id. art. 17.
31. Id. art. 1, pmbl. para. 10.
32. Id. art. 13(b).
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III. A REVIEW OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO THE ICC

At the 1998 diplomatic conference that resulted in the adoption of
the Rome Statute, the United States was an active participant.3 3 There is
little doubt that the U.S. delegation negotiated in good faith; indeed,
from 1995 the administration of President Bill Clinton had been
committed to the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court in some form.3 4 Although the American delegation secured a
number of concessions in the early stages of the negotiations,3 5 as the
conference wore on, the United States "adopted an unyielding position"
on some of the outstanding issues. Ultimately, many of the other
delegations decided "that it would be better to stop giving in to the
United States;"37 thus, American protests were largely ignored as a
compromise package was presented and agreed to by the majority of
delegations in the last week of the conference. The United States was
one of seven delegations to vote against the adoption of the Statute, 38
and afterwards the lead American negotiator declared that the United
States "will not sign the treaty in its present form." 39
33. See generally Scheffer, supra note 26 (describing the U.S. delegation's contributions
to the Rome Diplomatic Conference).
34. Id. at 12.
35. Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 457 (reporting that "the articles dealing with procedure
and with the definition of crimes were substantially as the United States wanted."); see also
Scheffer, supra note 26, at 15-17.
36. Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 457.
37. Id.
38. The unrecorded vote in favor of adoption of the Statute was 120-7, with 21
abstentions. Because they publicly explained the rationale for their dissenting votes, it is certain
that China, Israel, and the United States voted against the Statute. See Press Release, United
Nations, U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. L/ROM/22 (July 17, 1998). According to two
participants, the records of "most observers" indicated that Iraq, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen also
cast dissenting votes. Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the International
Criminal Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic
Conference, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 27 (1999). However, Cassese states that negative votes
came from Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. ANTONIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

330 (2d ed. 2008). A member of the South Korean delegation suggests that Iraq, Iran, and India
may have voted against the Statute. Young Sok Kim, The Preconditionsto the Exercise of the
Jurisdictionof the InternationalCriminal Court: With Focus on Article 12 of the Rome Statute,
8 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 47, 48 (1999); Christopher C. Joyner & Christopher C. Posteraro, The
United States and the InternationalCriminalCourt: Rethinking the Struggle Between National
Interests and International Justice, 10 CRiM L.F. 359, 360 n.5 (1999) (including Indonesia,
Russia, and Saudi Arabia among the suspected States). Of the states suspected by the various
authors, Iran, Russia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen eventually became signatories to the Rome
Statute, and Indonesia has affirmed its intention to accede to the treaty. Ary Hermawan, RI
Committed to Ratifying ICC,But Doubt Remains, JAKARTA POST, May 5, 2009, at 12.
39. Scheffer, supra note 26, at 21.
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It was therefore somewhat surprising when late on December 31
2000, the lame-duck Clinton administration signed the Rome Statute .4
It was the final day the Statute was open for signature, and President
Clinton stated that being a signatory would provide the United States
with a platform from which it could more effectivel? negotiate
modifications to correct the "significant flaws" of the ICC.4 In the year
and a half since the Rome Conference had concluded, the United States
had continued to negotiate and seek accommodations under the Statute
but had encountered little sympathy or success. 42
Upon signing the Rome Statute, President Clinton announced that he
was not recommending that his successor, President Bush immediately
submit the Rome Statute to the Senate for ratification.# However, it
soon became apparent that no such advice was required: nowhere was
the Bush administration's general approach to international law better
illustrated than in its strategy in relation to the ICC. Early on in
President Bush's first term, the United States abandoned the ICC
negotiations 44 and adopted a relatively antagonistic posture toward the
court. Such an approach was not a complete surprise: the Republican
Party's platform for the 2000 campaign had stated that "as matter of
U.S. sovereigty," American troops must never be subject to ICC
jurisdiction. Furthermore, some members of the Bush administration
were fiercely opposed to the ICC, most notably John R. Bolton, the
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
who had advocated an American approach to the ICC characterized by
"Three No's": "no financial support, directly or indirectly; no
cooperation; and no further negotiations with other governments to
'improve' the ICC."46
By the end of March 2002, when it became clear that the Rome
Statute would soon receive its 60th ratification, U.S. State Department
officials were confirming that the United States intended on having no

40. Steven Lee Myers, US. Signs Treatyfor World Court to Try Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2001, at Al.
4 1. Id.
42. See Bruce Broomhall, Toward US. Acceptance of the International Criminal Court,
64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2001).

43.

Myers, supra note 40.

44.

BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 178 (2003).

45.

Republican Party Platform of 2000 (July 31, 2000), quoted in Ralph Dannheisser,

Platforms: How the PartiesDefine their Policy Positions,5 U.S. FOREIGN POL'Y AGENDA, Sept.

2000, at 26, 28.
46. John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the InternationalCriminalCourtfrom
America's Perspective,41 VA. J. INT'L L. 186, 202 (2000).
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further involvement with the ICC.47 Five weeks later, Bolton informed
U.N. General-Secretary Kofi Annan by letter that the United States did
not intend to ratify the Statute and that therefore "the United States has
no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2 0 0 0 .'A'
The action-which the media perhaps oversimplified as an "unsigning"
of the treaty 49 -WaS of uncertain legality under both domestic and
international law, simply because it was unprecedented.o
After withdrawing from the treaty, the United States embarked on
what has been described as an "isolate and ignore" strategy. 5 The
strategy consisted of three distinct tactics. First, in August 2002 the
American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA)52 was enacted,
which prohibited any government agency, including courts, from
cooperating with or providing assistance to the ICC.53 ASPA also
prohibited the United States from providing military aid to ICC member
stateS54 and authorized the President to use "all means necessary and
appropriate" to free any American national being detained by or on
behalf of the ICC.5 5 The "Hague Invasion Act," as it was dubbed by its
critics, 56 received broad bipartisan support in Congress and was signed
47. Elizabeth A. Neuffer, U.S. to Back Out of World Court Plan;Envoy: Bush Team May
'Unsign' Treaty, BosToN GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2002, at A22.

48. Letter from John R. Bolton, Undersec'y of State for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., U.S.
State Dep't, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y-Gen. (May 6, 2002), available at http://archivescnn.
com/2002/US/05/06/court.letter.text/index.html.
49.

See, e.g., Editorial, The Unsigned Treaty, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 9, 2002, at

B6; Glenn Kessler, Concerns Over War Crimes Court Not New: U.S. Accused of Forgoing
Chance to Seek Changes to Ease Clinton-Era Worries, WASH. POST, July 2, 2002, at A9; Jed
Babbin, Steady, Not Wobbly: Bush has a Contract with the Troops, WASH. TIMES, July 4, 2002,
at Al9.
50. For an analysis of the action's legality under international law, see Curtis A. Bradley,
US. Announces Intent Not to Ratify InternationalCriminalCourt Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, May
2002, http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfin. For a general analysis of the executive's power to
withdraw from treaties under U.S. domestic law, see David C. Scott, Comment, Presidential
Power to "Un-sign" Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1447 (2002).
51. Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington?
US. Policy Towards the InternationalCriminalCourt, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 557, 590 (2003).
52. American Servicemembers' Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-33 (2006), Pub. L.
No. 107-206, §§ 2001-15, 116 Stat. 820, 899-909 (2002).
53. Id. §§ 7423, 7425.
54. Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 2007, 116 Stat. 820, 905 (2002) (repealed 2008). Exceptions
were made for NATO Member States, major non-NATO allies (including Argentina, Australia,
Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, and South Korea), and Taiwan. The President was
also empowered to waive the prohibition if the country entered into a bilateral immunity
agreement with the United States. These agreements are discussed infra.
55. 22 U.S.C. § 7427.
56. See, e.g., Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.: 'Hague Invasion Act' Becomes
Law: White House "Stops at Nothing" in Campaign Against War Crimes Court (Aug. 3, 2002),
availableat http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/8-3-02HRWBushSignsASPA.pdf.
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into law by President Bush.s"
Second, the United States pressed the S.C. to pass a resolution that
would permanently guarantee immunity from ICC prosecution for all
U.N. peacekeepers. This proposal was vigorously criticized and resisted
by the other members of the S.C., but after the United States vetoed a
resolution that would have renewed the mandate for the U.N. mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina because it did not exempt peacekeepers from
ICC jurisdiction, the S.C. reluctantly passed a resolution that imposed a
one-year exemption.5 8 (The Rome Statute explicitly allows the S.C. to
use its U.N. Charter Chapter VII powers to defer investiation or
prosecution of any case for a renewable period of 12 months.) 9 A year
later, the immunity was renewed for another 12 months6 0 amid
continuing protests in the S.C.6 1 In 2004, the United States again sought
renewal of the immunity, but the proposal was withdrawn as the
controversy intensified over the photographs of American soldiers
committing prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 62
The final tactic adopted by the United States was bilateral: the
negotiation and conclusion of bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs),
also known as "article 98 agreements." The latter name refers to article
98 of the Rome Statute, which prohibits the ICC from demanding the
extradition of a person if the request "would require the requested State
to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements
pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender
a person of that State to the Court." 63 The most significant provision of
a typical BIA negotiated by the United States is that the agreeing
country pledges to never arrest an American national on an ICC warrant
or extradite an American national for trial before the ICC without the
consent of the United States. In return, the United States does one of the
following: (1) if the country is not an ICC member, the United States
provides a reciprocal promise to the agreeing state, promising never to
arrest one of its nationals on an ICC warrant or extradite one of its

57. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2002, at Al.
58. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002). For a contemporary report on
the negotiations that led to the resolution, see Serge Schmemann, US. Peacekeepers Given
Year's Immunity FromNew Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A3.
59. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 16.
60. S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003).
61. Felicity Barringer, U.N. Renews US. Peacekeepers' Exemption From Prosecution,
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2003, at A18.
62. Warren Hoge, U.S. Drops Plan to Exempt G.I.'sfrom U.N Court, N.Y. TmIE, June
24, 2004, at Al.
63. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 98(2).
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nationals to the ICC without consent;6 or (2) if the state is an ICC
member, the United States agrees to waive the ban on U.S. military aid
to the country that had been imposed by ASPA. By January 2009, 104
countries had entered into a formal BIA with the United States65 and by
January 2010, 96 of these agreements were in force.
While the Bush administration made significant progress in the first
years of its "isolate and ignore" strategy, the administration's
enthusiasm for it began to wane in 2004, and it all but died out during
the second Bush term. 67 All three strategies in the administration's
three-pronged attack were somewhat blunted during the second term.
First, at no time during the second term did the United States request the
S.C. to institute a permanent or temporary blanket ICC immunity for
U.N. peacekeepers. Second, the provision of ASPA that prohibited U.S.
military aid from being provided to an ICC Member State was repealed
68
in 2008. Finally, the State Department slowed, though did not cease,
bilateral immunity negotiations: the vast majority of BIAs were
negotiated and concluded during the first Bush term. The
administration's more restrained approach was most evident in 2005,
when the United States opted not to veto S.C. Resolution 1593, which
referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC Prosecutor in
accordance with the procedure set out in article 13(b) of the Rome

64. Commentators have suggested that it is likely that such a provision goes far beyond
what article 98(2) allows, since the provision appears on its face to be limited to persons "sent"
by one state to another state, such as diplomats, military personnel, or other government
officials. In contrast, the U.S. agreements explicitly apply to all American nationals, regardless
of whether or not they have been "sent" by the U.S. government. The lead American negotiator
at the Rome Conference agrees that the Bush administration's use of article 98(2) is an
overextension of the article's originally envisaged purpose. David J. Scheffer, Article 98(2) of
the Rome Statute: America's Original Intent, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 335 (2005). See also
Samantha V. Ettari, A Foundation of Granite or Sand?: The InternationalCriminal Court and
UnitedStates BilateralImmunity Agreements, 30 BROOKLYN J.INT'L L. 205 (2004); Chet J. Tan,
Jr., The ProliferationofBilateralNon-SurrenderAgreements Among Non-Ratifiers of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1115; David A. Tallman,
Catch 98(2): Article 98 Agreements and the Dilemma of Treaty Conflict, 92 GEO. L.J. 1033
(2004).
65. Nicholas Kralev, U.S. Warms to Global Court: Washington Sees Good in Tribunal
but Won't Joinfor Now, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, availableat http://washingtontimes.com/
news/2009/apr/30/us-warms-to-global-panel.
66. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADvISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON

JANuARY

1,

2010

(2010),

available and updated annually http://www.state.gov/

documents/organization/123747.pdf.

67.
68.
69.

2005-2009.
Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 371 (2008).
S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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Statute.7 0 (The United States agreed to abstain from voting on the
resolution once a clause was inserted that guaranteed exclusive
jurisdiction to the sending state if any non-Sudanese national committed
ICC crimes while acting as a peacekeeper in Sudan.)7 1 By 2006, senior
U.S. military officials appeared to be engaging in a "fresh assessment"
of the ICC and its potential.72
In mid-2008, public support in the United States for American
engagement with the ICC had reportedly reached 68%, including
majority support from both Republicans and Democrats. Although
American policy toward the ICC played no significant role in the 2008
U.S. presidential election, a surprising number of major candidates were
in favor of American membership in the ICC. Among the losing
Democratic contenders, John Edwards, Bill Richardson, Chris Dodd,
and Dennis Kucinich were all explicitly in favor of the United States
joining the court,74 while Hillary Clinton criticized Bush's "unsigning"
of the Rome Statute and was willing to examine if the United States
should "engage" with the ICC.75 None of the Republican candidates
expressed any support for the ICC during the campaign, though John
McCain had a history of supporting U.S. membership in principle if
more safeguards against Americans being prosecuted could be
provided.7 6 Barack Obama, the eventual winner, was as neutral as any
other candidate on the issue. Although during his 2004 Senate campaign
Obama had expressed his support for U.S. ratification of the Rome
Statute in a one-word answer on an election candidate questionnaire,7 7
during the 2008 presidential campaign he stated that "it is premature to
commit the U.S. to any course of action at this time . .. I will consult

thoroughly with our military commanders and also examine the track
70. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 13(b). Absent the referral from the S.C., the ICC
could not exercise jurisdiction over crimes that are committed by Sudanese nationals in the
territory of Sudan because Sudan has not ratified the Rome Statute.
71. Warren Hoge, U.N. Votes to Send Any Sudan War Crime Suspects to World Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al.
72. Nora Boustany, A Shift in the Debate on InternationalCourt: Some U.S. Officials
Seem to Ease Disfavor, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2006, at A16.
73. CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS, ANxious AMERICANS SEEK A NEW
DIRECTION IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: RESULTS OF A 2008 SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION

13 (2008).
74. Bob Egelko, PresidentialCandidatesDiverge on U.S. Joining War Crimes Court,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 2008, at Al.

75. Hillary Clinton, Response to Question No. 10, Citizens for Global Solutions' 2008
Presidential Candidate Questionnaire, available at http://www.globalsolutions.org/08orbust/
pcq/clinton.
76. Egelko, supra note 74.
77. Barack Obama, Response to Question No. 4, Citizens for Global Solutions' 2004
Election Candidate Questionnaire, availableat http://globalsolutions.org/politics/electionsand_
candidates/questionnaire/2004?id=20.
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record of the Court before reaching a decision on whether the U.S.
should become a State Party to the ICC."78
Not surprisingly, the cautious approach advocated by both Obama
and Clinton during the campaign has been adopted by the Clinton-led
State Department in the first years of the Obama administration. In a
written response to a question from the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee during her confirmation procedure, Clinton set out the new
administration's position on the ICC:
[T]he Bush administration has indicated a willingness to
cooperate with the ICC in the Darfur investigation, a position
which the new Administration will support. But at the same time,
we must also keep in mind that the U.S. has more troops
deployed overseas than any other nation. As Commander-inChief, the President-Elect will want to ensure they continue to
have maximum protection. Therefore, we intend to consult
thoroughly within the government, including the military, as well
as non-governmental experts, and examine the full track record of
the ICC before reaching decisions on how to move forward....
Whether we work toward joining or not, we will end hostility
towards the ICC, and look for opportunities to encourage
effective ICC action in ways that promote U.S. interests by
bringing war criminals to justice.7 9
Thus, although the policy of official American hostility toward the
ICC may have come to an end, the advent of the Obama administration
does not automatically mean that U.S. membership in the court will be
embraced. Indeed, American objections to the ICC remain and must be
considered in any discussion of the possibility of future U.S. ratification
of the Rome Statute.

IV. AMERICAN

OBJECTIONS TO THE ROME STATUTE AND THE

ICC

The American objections to the Rome Statute and the ICC can be
conveniently grouped into five general classes, each of which will be
examined below: the exposure of American nationals to ICC
prosecution; the exposure of nationals of ICC non-member states to ICC
78. Barack Obama, Response to Question No. 10, Citizens for Global Solutions' 2008
Presidential Candidate Questionnaire, availableat http://www.globalsolutions.org/08orbust/pcq/
obama.
79. Hillary Clinton, Responses by Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State-designate, to PrehearingQuestionsfor the Recordfrom Sen. John Kerry, S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 111th Cong.

66 (2009).
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prosecution; the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome
Statute; the risk of politically motivated prosecutions; and the
incompatibility of the Rome Statute with the U.S. Constitution.
A. The Exposure ofAmerican Nationals to ICCProsecution
Perhaps the most common American objection to membership in the
ICC is that U.S. membership will result in the possibility of American
nationals being prosecuted by the ICC. The underlying reason that this
possibility is objectionable often varies from critic to critic, but most
often the concerns center on either the likelihood of Americans being
targeted for vexatious prosecutions by a politically motivated court8 0 or
on the ICC's lack of provision for trial by jury or other rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants by the U.S. Constitution. 8 ' Both these
objections are valid concerns, and due to their complexity each will be
addressed in detail separately.8 2
Other critics object to the concept of an international court
exercising jurisdiction over American nationals simply on the grounds
of U.S. sovereignty or as an otherwise abstract matter of principle or
political ideology. While these feelings are understandable, they are
nevertheless misplaced for a variety of reasons. The most common
response to this objection is that the Rome Statute's principle of
"complementarity" ensures that no individual may be prosecuted by the
ICC unless all the states with natural jurisdiction over the case (the state
where the alleged crime took place and the state of the accused's
nationality) are "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution." 84 Defenders of the Court generally point
out that because the United States is the kind of country that typically
investigates and prosecutes alleged war crimes committed by its
military personnel, the ICC will never be required to take up a case with

80. See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 46, at 194-96.
81. See, e.g., Steven T. Voigt, The UnitedStates must Remain Steadfastly Opposed to the
Rome Treaty InternationalCriminalCourt, 12 WIDENER L.J. 619, 620-23 (2003).
82. In Parts I.D and III.E., respectively.
83. See, e.g., Richard W. Rahn, Op-Ed., Drift to World Government?, WASH. TIMES, May
31, 2005, at Al6; Lou Schroeder, Letter to the Editor, Court a Threat to Sovereignty,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY (Los Angeles), July 8, 2002, at 17 (calling the ICC "one insidious,
globalist proposal to rob Americans of our God-given rights"); J. Jacobs, Letter to the Editor,
InternationalCourt an Outrageous Power Grab, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 31, 1998, at 19
("The ICC is another effort by the crafty 'one-worlders' to take power away from individual
citizens in their homeland and put them on trial before officials of a foreign nation.").
84. Rome Statute, supranote 12, art. 17(1)(a).
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an American accused, because the United States will always assume its
domestic jurisdiction over such an incident.8 5
However, as has been pointed out, "complementarity is not a
complete answer" to this concern, 86 because the Rome Statute permits
the judges of the ICC to conclude that an investigation or prosecution
that occurred was not genuine87 and thereby could allow for the
prosecution of an American even after the United States has
investigated and decided not to prosecute.88 The reluctance of the
Obama administration to launch criminal investigations into the
authorization and use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" on
American-held prisoners" is also a reminder that the United States will
not necessarily investigate every allegation that its military personnel or
other officials have committed war crimes.
A more satisfactory answer to the concern that an American will be
prosecuted is found elsewhere, in the developing case law and practice
of the ICC. In 2006, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC ruled that a
prosecution cannot proceed before the Court unless the following three
questions can be answered affirmatively: 90 is the conduct which is the
object of a case systematic or large-scale?; is the accused person in the
category of most senior leaders of the situation under investigation?;
and is the accused person in the category of most senior leaders
suspected of being most responsible for the commission of the alleged
ICC crimes?
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, if the answer to any of the three
questions is negative, the case is not admissible before the ICC, because
the negative answer means that the case is "not of sufficient gravity to
justify further action by the Court." 9 ' If the Lubanga decision were
adhered to by the ICC, any case involving either isolated acts by
American nationals or the actions of non-senior "bad apple" soldiers in
the U.S. military would not result in an ICC prosecution, even if the
United States had ratified the Rome Statute. Although the ICC Appeals
Chamber has stated that the Pre-Trial Chamber's three-part Lubanga

85. See, e.g., John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An
Examinationof U.S. Objections to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85, 102 (2000).
86. Scheffer, supra note 26, at 19.
87. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 17(1)(a)-(b), (2).
88. See Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing
an InternationalCriminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National
CriminalJurisdictions?,35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, passim (2002).

89.

See Peter Baker & Scott Shane, Pressure Grows to Investigate Interrogations,N.Y.

TIMEs, Apr. 21, 2009, at Al.

90. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, para. 63 (Feb. 10, 2006).
91. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 17(1)(d).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss2/1

14

Smith: Definitely Maybe: The Outlook for U.S. Relations with the Interna

DEFINITELY M YBE: THE OUTLOOK FOR US RELATIONS WITH THE ICC

2010]

169

test is "flawed" and "incorrect," 92 the case nevertheless demonstrates
the lack of enthusiasm at the Court for the prosecution of "small fry" or
low-level perpetrators. Although this pre-disposition does not
completely eliminate the possibility of an American national being
prosecuted, it does make the prospect exceedingly unlikely, since the
most senior leaders of the American military do not authorize the
commission of widespread or systematic crimes of the type that are
described by the Rome Statute.
However, a skeptical observer would point out that there are reasons
to believe that at least some of the prisoner abuse committed by
American soldiers at prisons in Iraq and Guantinamo Bay may have
been authorized or ordered by "senior leaders," 93 with perhaps even the
highest leaders of the U.S. executive branch being implicated.9 4 But
even if we assume that in these instances war crimes-as the Rome
Statute defines them-were committed by American nationals, the
incidents would still not satisfy the Rome Statute's requirement that the
offences be of "sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court." 95 The experience of the British military in the Iraq War is
instructive in this regard, because as with the American military, the
British have been accused of committing war crimes against its
prisoners in Iraq. The United Kingdom has been a member of the ICC
since its inception.9 6 Thus, British nationals involved in the Iraq War are
subject to the ICC's jurisdiction, regardless of where their actions take
place. Upon receiving complaints regarding the action of British
nationals in Iraq, the Prosecutor of the ICC determined in a preliminary
investigation that "there was a reasonable basis to believe" that the war
crimes of wilful killing97 and inhuman treatment 98 were committed by
British military personnel against prisoners of war. 99 However, upon
92. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment
on the Prosecutor's Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled "Decision on
the Prosecutor's Applications for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58," paras. 82, 68 (July 13, 2006).
93.

See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABu GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg

& Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (containing many of the so-called "torture memos" that legally
justified or ordered treatment that some characterize as torture).
94. R. Jeffrey Smith & Peter Finn, Harsh Methods Approved as Early as Summer 2002:
Holder Declassifies Timeline of Actions by Top Bush Administration Officials Regarding
Interrogation,WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2009, at Al; Scott Shane et al., Secret U.S. Endorsement of
Severe Interrogations,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at Al.
95. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 17(1)(d).
96. The United Kingdom ratified the Rome Statute on October 4, 2001 and implemented
its provisions by enacting the International Criminal Court Act, 2001, c. 17.
97. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 8(2)(a)(i).
98. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
99. Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC (Feb. 9, 2006) at 8,
availableat http://tinyurl.com/d2egkp.
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considering the gravity threshold of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor
concluded:
The Office [of the Prosecutor] considers various factors in
assessing gravity. A key consideration is the number of victims
of particularly serious crimes, such as wilful killing or rape. The
number of potential victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court in this situation--4 to 12 victims of wilful killing and a
limited number of victims of inhuman treatment-was of a
different order than the number of victims found in other
situations under investigation or analysis by the Office. It is
worth bearing in mind that the OTP is currently investigating
three situations involving long-running conflicts in Northern
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur. Each of
the three situations under investigation involves thousands of
wilful killings as well as intentional and large-scale sexual
violence and abductions. Collectively, they have resulted in the
displacement of more than 5 million people. Other situations
under analysis also feature hundreds or thousands of such
crimes.100
Thus, the ICC Prosecutor determined that the gravity threshold was
not satisfied, and he refused to proceed with a formal investigation of
the accused British nationals.' 0
We can therefore presume that if the United States were a member of
the ICC, even the most suspect actions that have been committed by
American nationals in the past decade would not have reached a formal
investigatory phase before the ICC. This conclusion is unchanged even
if it we accept that "Rome Statute war crimes" were in fact committed
by American nationals in Iraq and Guantinamo Bay, which in and of
itself is a condition precedent on which reasonable observers could
disagree. The ICC is a mechanism for dealing with the commission of
mass atrocities, not every technical breach of international humanitarian
law. American nationals may occasionally commit war crimes, but
senior U.S. leaders are simply not in the business of orchestrating
systematic or widespread murders, rapes, and abuses.
Finally on this point, it should of course not be forgotten that
American nationals have already been subject to the potential
jurisdiction of the ICC for eight years. Through the application of the
territoriality principle,10 2 if an American commits an ICC crime on the
territory of a state that is a member of the ICC, the Court could exercise
100. Id. at 8-9.
101. Id. at 9.
102. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 12(2)(a).
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jurisdiction over the American if neither the United States nor the other
state acted to investigate or prosecute the offence. While the American
BIAs are intended to prevent surrender of an American national to the
ICC, they do not abrogate the jurisdiction of the ICC over the territory
of its member states. Afghanistan has been a member of the ICC since
2003, and the United States has been involved in a war within its
territory since that time, but no serious suggestion has been made that
the ICC prosecute an American national for any actions that have
occurred in Afghanistan. The past and continuing behavior of the ICC
in interpreting and applying the Rome Statute leaves little doubt that an
American national will never be brought before the Court on charges of
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.
B. The Exposure ofNationals ofICC Non-member States to
ICC Prosecution
A national of a state that is not a member of the ICC can be subject
to ICC jurisdiction in four different situations: (1) if the person commits
an ICC crime on the territory of an ICC member state;'o (2) if the
situation is referred to the ICC by a S.C. resolution under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter; 104 (3) if the person's home state (a non-par%) accepts
the jurisdiction of the ICC and refers the case to the Court;' or (4) if
the ICC crime is committed on the territory of a non-member state, but
the state with territorial jurisdiction accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC
and refers the case to the Court.1 06
Situations (2) and (3) do not concern American objections, because
there is no chance that the United States would refrain from vetoing a
S.C. resolution that would purport to refer a situation involving
American nationals to the ICC, nor is there a chance that the United
States itself would refer a situation involving one of its nationals to the
ICC. However, situations (1) and (4) are of concern: the fact that
nationals of non-member states can nevertheless be potentially subject
to ICC jurisdiction has been a pivotal American criticism of the Court
since the Rome Statute was finalized.1 0 7 This criticism has been
described as the "main obstacle to United States accession to the Rome
103. Id.
104. Id. art. 13(b).
105. Id. art. 12(2)(b), (3).
106. Id. art. 12(2)(a), (3).
107. Is a U.N. InternationalCriminalCourt in the U.S. NationalInterest?: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Int'l Operationsof the S. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 105th Cong. 13 (1998)
[hereinafter ICC Hearing] (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep't of State); Scheffer, supranote 26, at 18.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

17

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 1

172

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

Treaty',to and one whose resolution "is perhaps the most important in
securing U.S. support."' The reason that this concern is so central is
obvious: the United States is currently a non-member of the ICC, and
even if it begins to move toward acceptance of the Court, "U.S.
ratification could take many years . . .. Thus, the United States would

likely have nonparty status under the ICC treaty for a significant period
of time."11 0
This objection is usually couched in terms of the fundamental
principle of international law that absent the development of customary
law, a treaty binds only the states that are party to it and creates neither
obligations nor rights for so-called "third states.""' However, as has
been pointed out elsewhere, the objection that the Rome Statute creates
binding obligations on non-state parties "is a mischaracterization of the
effect of the Statute."ll 2 If a case involving an American national
accused of committing crimes on foreign soil was referred to the ICC by
the state with territorial jurisdiction over the crimes, the United States
would have no legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC, whether or
not the referring state was a member of the ICC. States are only legall
obligated to cooperate with the ICC if they are members of the ICC 3
or if a S.C. resolution mandates such cooperation. Thus, absent a S.C.
referral, the United States has no obligation-binding or otherwise-to
cooperate with the ICC as long as it remains a non-party to the Rome
Statute.
Of course, this does not obviate the American objection that a nonstate party could refer American action to the ICC. Early on, a common
scenario used to illustrate the unfairness of the Statute's application was
the possibility that Saddam Hussein's Iraq (a non-state party) could
refer to the ICC a situation involving American military action in Iraq;
in such a case, a seeming absurdity would result in that the ICC would
have jurisdiction to prosecute Americans, but it could not prosecute
Hussein for the atrocities he had committed against his own people."14
While it is true that this result appears unjust and therefore problematic,
108. Seth Harris, Comment, The United States and the International Criminal Court:
Legal Potentialfor Non-PartyState Jurisdiction,23 HAwAII L. REv. 277, 296 (2000).
109. Ruth Wedgwood, The UnitedStates and the InternationalCriminal Court:Achieving
a Wider Consensus Through the "IthacaPackage," 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 535, 540 (1999).
110. Scheffer, supra note 26, at 18.
111. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 34-38, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S.
331.
112. Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the International
CriminalCourt and the Commitment to InternationalLaw, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 369 (1999).
113. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 86.
114. David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of
State, Statement on Creating an International Criminal Court: America's Stake in Peace,
Security, and Justice (Aug. 31, 1998), AM. Soc. INT'L L. NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 1.
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it is not an anomaly that the Rome Statute has created. Absent the Rome
Statute, Iraq would possess the sovereign power to commence criminal
proceedings against an American for actions that take place in Iraqi
territory.
The principle of jurisdiction based on territoriality is foundational to
the common law of crimes and is the least controversial basis of
criminal jurisdiction. "All crime in local," as the saying goes," 5 and the
principle of territoriality applies irrespective of the nationality of the
accused."l 6 Universal jurisdiction for the ICC was favored by some
delegations at the Rome Conference," 7 but the concept was abandoned
in large part because of vigorous opposition by the United States.
In its place, jurisdiction based on territoriality or nationality was
substituted." 8 Therefore, the Rome Statute provides nothing more than
an alternative forum to which states can refer criminal matters that are
already within the jurisdiction of the referring state. Although some
have questioned the validity of such jurisdictional delegation under
international law," 9 the more dominant view-and clearly the one that
was broadly accepted at the Rome Conference-is that such a
jurisdictional delegation "is an entirely valid exercise of national
sovereignty."' 2 0 The United States would be under no obligation to
cooperate with an ICC investigation or prosecution of an American
national for acts committed in Iraq, just as the United States would not
be obligated to cooperate with criminal proceedings against Americans
in domestic Iraqi courts. The Rome Statute changes nothing but the
offended state's choice of court.' 21
115. Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, [1891] A.C. 455, 458 (P.C.). See
also Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) ("[Tlhe general and almost
universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done.").
116. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 504

(Transnat'l Publishers, Inc. 2003). The irrelevance of nationality explains why it is acceptable
practice in international law for State A to extradite a person of State B nationality to State C
when the alleged crime was committed in State C. Although State B may oppose the extradition
of its national, its opposition does not vitiate the legality of the extradition or the subsequent
prosecution.
117. Scheffer, supra note 26, at 17-18.
118. The ICC could be said to have "universal jurisdiction" only in the sense that it has
jurisdiction over any situation referred to it by the S.C. Referrals from states must be grounded
in jurisdiction based on territoriality or nationality.
119. See, e.g., Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and NonPartyStates, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 13 (2001).
120. BASSIOUNI, supranote 116, at 504.

121. The same basic principle-that the offended state selects the court-explains why
after the Second World War it was permissible for the Allies to try some accused war criminals
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Therefore, although the concern that the Rome Statute exposes the
nationals of non-state parties to prosecution is a valid national security
consideration that American officials should be aware of, it is
nevertheless an invalid criticism of the Statute itself, since the Statute
does not create any obligation for non-state parties and does not change
the long-standing principle of jurisdiction through territoriality.
Essentially, this concern is a more technical but ultimately misguided
means of expressing the understandable fear that the ICC may prosecute
an American national. But for the reasons discussed in Part IV.A, such a
prosecution is an unlikely prospect.
C. The Inclusion of the Crime ofAggression in the Rome Statute
Of all the issues that had to be decided at the Rome Conference, the
debate over the crime of aggression provoked some of the sharpest
debate. Most developing states wanted aggression included as one of the
while the United States and other military
ICC's "core crimes,"'
powers refused to consider its inclusion until the definition of the crime
had been settled.123 The negotiations essentially "ended in a tie,"l 24 and
the compromise Statute that resulted gave the ICC only the potential for
prospective jurisdiction over aggression. In the original text of the
Statute, the crime of aggression was listed-along with genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes-as one of the "most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,"l 25 but
ICC jurisdiction over the crime was deferred until the Statute had been
amended to include a definition of aggression and a specification of the
conditions that would "trigger" the Court's jurisdiction over it.12 6 The
Statute mandated that seven years after it entered into force, a Review
Conference of the ASP will be held where such amendments to the
Statute could be considered.12 7 This review conference was held at
Kampala, Uganda on May 31 to June 11, 2010, and it resulted in the
ASP adopting amendments to the Statute on the definition of aggression
before national tribunals of single countries and others before international military tribunals in
Nuremberg and Tokyo.
122. Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International
Criminal Court: The NegotiatingProcess, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 4 (1999).
123. Scheffer, supranote 26, at 21.
124. Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, Completing the Work of the Preparatory
Commission: The Working Group on Aggression at the Preparatory Commission for the
InternationalCriminal Court,25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 589, 589 (2002).
125. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 5(1).
126. Id. art. 5(2), repealed by Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. No. RC/Res.6 Annex I (June 11, 2010),
availableat http://tinyurl.com/32b56kt [hereinafter Crime of Aggression Amendments], art. 1.
127. Id. art. 123 (1).
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and a triggering procedure for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over
it.128

As a result of these amendments, the crime of aggression is defined
in the Statute's new article 8 bis as "the planning, preparation, initiation
or execution, . . . of an act of aggression, which, by its character, gravity
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations."l 2 9 The meaning of "act of aggression" is drawn directly from
a 1974 U.N. General Assembly resolution which provided a definition
of aggression: 130 generally, an act of aggression is "the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State."' As with the 1974 resolution, a nonexhaustive list of actions that qualify as aggressive acts is also
included. 132
Thus the Statute's definition of aggression essentially adheres to the
U.N. Charter's approach to the use of armed force: it is illegal unless it
is an exercise of self-defence in the face of an armed attack 3 3 or,
alternatively, military action authorized by the S.C. under Chapter
VII. 134 If the Statute's new definition meant that American nationals
would be vulnerable to prosecution for the crime of aggression based on
future actions of the U.S. military, this alone would provide a
persuasive reason to maintain robust U.S. opposition to the Court. After
all, there is little doubt that in the past, the United States has engaged in
military action that would constitute "acts of aggression" under the
Statute's definition. While the legality of each individual case of
American military action is arguable, a discussion of specific incidents
and the legal arguments advanced by each side is beyond the scope of
this Article. But it suffices to say that American acts of alleged
aggression in places such as Nicaragua,13 5 Serbia, 3 6 and Iraq' 3 7 are
precisely the types of situations that could be captured by the Statute's
128. Crime of Aggression Amendments, supra note 126.
129. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 8 bis(1).
130. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/3314 (Dec.
14, 1974).
131. Rome Statute, supranote 12, art. 8 bis(2).
132. Id. art. 8 bis(2)(a)-(g).
133. U.N. Charter art. 51.
134. Id. art. 42.
135. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146 (June 27) (holding that the U.S. military and paramilitary
activities in Nicaragua could not be justified as collective self-defence).
136.

INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT (2000) (determining that

NATO military action in Serbia and Kosovo was an "illegal but legitimate" humanitarian
intervention).
137. Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177
(2004) (questioning the legality of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq).
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definition of the crime of aggression. Barring a significant policy shift
that would dramatically reduce the types of disputes that the United
States is willing to use military force to resolve, the United States would
not find membership in an ICC that could prosecute its nationals for
crimes of aggression to be consistent with its self-interests. 138
However, the Statute's provisions on the triggering procedure for the
crime of aggression-which are found in articles 15 bis and 15 ternow provide a complete answer to this concern. In short, the amended
Statute provides comprehensive protections for states such as the United
States that may wish to exempt themselves from the ICC's jurisdiction
over aggression. First, unlike the other three crimes within the Court's
jurisdiction, the ICC is explicitly prohibited by the amended Statute
from exercising jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when the
crime is committed by nationals of a non-state party or on the territory
of a non-state party.'1 9 Therefore, as long as the United States remains
outside the ICC, all American nationals are immune from prosecution
for acts of aggression committed by the United States.
Second, the Statute allows a state that has ratified the Rome Statute
to exclude the Court's jurisdiction for acts of aggression committed by
its nationals simply by making a declaration to the ICC Registrar that it
does not accept the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.14 0
This procedure prevents the ICC from assuming jurisdiction over
aggressive acts of the declaring state in all situations, unless the case is
one that has been referred to the ICC by the U.N. S.C. 141 Thus, if the
United States ratified the Rome Statute, it could simultaneously issue a
declaration that would prevent the ICC from having jurisdiction over
cases where it is alleged that the United States has committed acts of
aggression. Such a declaration, combined with the U.S. veto power in
the S.C., would ensure that the ICC would never have jurisdiction to
prosecute American nationals for military actions carried out by the
United States even if the United States were to ratify the Rome Statute.
The Court's jurisdiction over aggression has essentially been converted
into a "bonus feature" of the ICC that each member state can elect to

138. Prior to the adoption of the amendments to the Statute in 2010, the possibility that
ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression would restrict the United States from using its
military to defend its national interests had been a common criticism of the ICC. See, e.g.,
Voigt, supra note 81, at 626-28; ICC Hearing, supra note 107, at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse
Helms) ("It will be a crime of aggression when the United States of America takes any military
action to defend the national interest of the American people unless the United States first seeks
and receives the permission of the United Nations. And I say baloney to that.").
139. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 15 bis(5).
140. Id. art. 15 bis(4).
141. See id. art. 15 ter, which governs the Court's exercise ofjurisdiction over the crime of
aggression in cases of S.C. referral. The section lacks a provision similar to that of art. 15 bis(4).
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opt out of or opt into.142 The compromise amendments on aggression
that have been adopted in 2010 are bound to be criticized as ones that
weaken the credibility of the ICC, but at the same time they have
essentially resolved one of the principal American objections to the
Statute. As a result of the 2010 amendments, the United States can no
longer criticize the Statute as one that will subject American politicians
or military leaders to prosecutions for the crime of aggression.
D. The Risk ofPoliticallyMotivatedInvestigationsand Prosecutions
In addition to investigations initiated by state referral and U.N. S.C.
referral, the Rome Statute also allows for an investigation to be initiated
by the Prosecutor proprio motu and in the absence of any referral. 143
Such a decision must be reviewed by a Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court
and a formal investigation can only be launched if the Chamber grants
its approval.'" Once approval is given, the case proceeds through the
Court in the same manner as a referred situation. At this writing, the
Prosecutor of the ICC has sought and has been granted approval to
commence an investigation proprio motu in just one situation, that of
the widespread post-election violence that occurred in Kenya in late

2007 and early 2008.145
During the Rome Conference, the United States unsuccessfully
opposed granting the OTP any ability to begin a case on its own
initiative. 6 A common American criticism of the Statute is that this
proprio motu power carries with it a risk of abuse (that more than one
American commentator has described as "enormous"),14 7 mainly
because of the lack of comprehensive checks and balances within the
ICC.148 As one commentator has bluntly argued: "the ICC answers to
nobody."14 9 John Bolton suggests that the politicization of the ICC is
inevitable, and points to the "highly politicized nature" of the
142. Under the provisions of the amendments, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction until at
least one year after thirty state parties have "opted in" and accepted the amendments. Id. arts. 15
bis(2), 15 ter(2). Even then, the Court's jurisdiction over regression will not commence until an
ASP decision made after January 1, 2017, that such jurisdiction should begin to be exercised. Id.
arts. 15 bis(3), 15 ter(3).
143. Id. art. 15.
144. Id.
145. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010).
146. Scheffer, supra note 26, at 14.
147. Bolton, supra note 46, at 196; Alfred P. Rubin, The International Criminal Court:
Possibilitiesfor ProsecutorialAbuse,64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 153, 154 (2001).
148. Bolton, supra note 46, at 195-96; Rubin, supra note 147, at 158.
149. Voigt, supra note 81, at 630.
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International Court of Justice as evidence that so-called "independent"
U.N. bodies eventually become tainted with anti-Americanism.so Other
commentators have dismissed these concerns as understandable but
ultimately unrealistic' 5 ' and have suggested that the internal judicial
checks on the Prosecutor's powers means that political abuse by the
Prosecutor will be "all but impossible."' 52
The improbability that an American national will be prosecuted
before the ICC have been discussed above in Part IV.A. Ultimately,
however, there is no answer that will satisfy those who criticize the
Court on the basis of its potential to become politicized: as long as the
OTP remains truly independent, the theoretical risk of abuse and
politicization is one that cannot be completely dismissed. As has long
been pointed out in relation to the prospects of an international criminal
court, there is nothing that can provide "total protection from the threat
of politicization. . . . All courts have the potential to be politicized,

including courts in the United States."15 3 (The American experience
with the perceived politicization of the United States Office of the
Independent Counsel undoubtedly plays a role in coloring American
opinions on the wisdom of appointing independent prosecutors in any
forum.)1 54 Some structural precautions have been instituted in the Rome
Statute to avoid politicization of the Court, and some monitoring and
management by member states to ensure that politicization does not
emerge as a problem will be appropriate; on balance, the risk of
politicization is undoubtedly outweighed by the potential benefits the
ICC can provide the world community.'ss But the risk of politicization
is not zero.
However, the early activity of the ICC again offers some clues as to
how the Court will function. First, the OTP waited until late 2009 to
seek permission to commence an investigation proprio motu; with
150. Bolton, supra note 46, at 194-95, 197-98.
151. See, e.g., Regina Horton, The Long Road To Hypocrisy: The United States and the
InternationalCriminalCourt,24 WHITTIER L. REV. 1041, 1065-67 (2003).
152. Christopher Keith Hall, The Powers and Role of the Prosecutorof the International
CriminalCourt in the Global FightAgainst Impunity, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 121, 125 (2004); see
also Theodor Meron, The Court We Want, WASH. PosT, Oct. 13, 1998, at Al5 (arguing that the
Statute's safeguards make politically-motivated prosecutions of U.S. military personnel "quite
improbable").
153. Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionalityof an International
CriminalCourt, 33 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 146 (1995).
154. See, e.g., ICC Hearing,supra note 107, at 36 (statement of Michael P. Scharf, Prof.
of Law and Dir., Ctr. for Int'l Law and Pol'y, New Eng. Sch. of Law, Boston, Mass.) (referring
to the independence of the Prosecutor as "the international Ken Starr problem"); Bolton, supra
note 46, at 194 ("Unfortunately, the United States has had considerable experience in the past
two decades with "independent counsels," and that depressing history argues overwhelmingly
against international repetition.").
155. Marquardt, supra note 153, at 146-47.
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ongoing investigations in four other situations and the arrest or
appearance of accused persons in three of them, the Prosecutor has had
neither the time nor the resources to launch politically motivated
charges. This is not to say that it has not been given the opportunity: the
OTP reports that it has received over 8733 communications from more
than 130 countries, with a majority of reports coming from individuals
in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and
France. ss According to a 2006 report, 42% of communications referred
to matters outside the jurisdiction of the Court and 38% constituted
"manifestly ill-founded communications."' 5 7 The remaining 20% were
judged to warrant further analysis,' 58 but thus far only the post-election
violence in Kenya has resulted in the commencement of a formal
investigation. Most notably, the Prosecutor refused to commence a case
against British soldiers in the Iraq War even though he determined that
there were reasons to believe that isolated war crimes took place. 5 9
This is not to say that the actions of the OTP have been without
fault. But when the OTP has acted unfairly, the judges of the ICC have
proved to be an effective independent check on prosecutorial abuses.
For example, in 2008 the Trial Chamber held that the OTP had
inappropriately withheld from an accused over 200 documents
containing potentially exculpatory material or material otherwise
relevant to defense preparation.16o The Chamber held that such actions
made a fair trial impossible and stayed the proceedings against the
accused.' 6 ' The Trial Chamber later ordered the release of the
accused,162 a result that was only avoided by the OTP's agreeing to give
the defense access to the exculpatory material.163 Any ill-founded
prosecution motivated by politics would require both the OTP and the
judges of the ICC to act in an inappropriate manner. In light of the past
behavior of both bodies, a politically motivated prosecution continues to
156. Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Crim. Ct., Communications, Referrals and Preliminary
Analysis, http://tinyurl.com/mqpu5g (last visited June 9, 2010).
157. Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Crim. Ct., Update on Communications Received by the
Prosecutorofthe ICC (Feb. 10, 2006), availableat http://tinyurl.com/q9ux3o.
158. Id.
159. Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 99, at 8-9. See also supra text accompanying notes 95101.
160. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-0 1/04-01/06, Decision on the consequences of
non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the
application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the
Status Conference on 10 June 2008 (June 13, 2008).
161. Id. 1193-94.
162. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the release of
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (July 2, 2008).
163. Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., Stay of Proceedings in the Lubanga Case is LiftedTrial Provisionally Scheduled for 26 January 2009 (Nov. 18, 2008), ICC Doc. No. ICC-CPI20081118-PR372.
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be theoretically possible, but even more improbable than it was when
the Rome Statute was crafted.
Reinstating the American signature to the Rome Statute or initiating
U.S. membership in the Court would make a politically motivated
prosecution of an American national even less likely. As has been
pointed out, vigorous American opposition to the ICC perversely results
in an increased likelihood that the ICC will respond to the United States
in kind, thus "turning hostility toward the court" on this objection "into
a self-fulfilling prophecy."'TM Reinstatement of the U.S. signature would
be widely viewed as the first step toward U.S. ratification of the Rome
Statute. American membership in the ICC is generally perceived as
being in the Court's best interests, and when that possibility is
resurrected in the minds of the judges and prosecutors, they will be
loath to take any action that would threaten the tender and embryonic
signs of U.S. support for the Court. But even without such
rapprochement, as with the more general fear that the ICC will
prosecute an American national, the concern of politically motivated
prosecutions is one that is theoretically possible but particularly
improbable.
E. The Incompatibility of the Rome Statute with the U.S. Constitution
Objections to the possibility of an American national being subject
to the jurisdiction of the ICC are often couched in constitutional terms.
First, there is a concern that American nationals would be subject to
prosecution before a court that does not include the rights that criminal
defendants enjoy under the Bill of Rights.165 Of primary concern is that
the ICC does not allow for trial by jury,1 66 a guarantee for criminal
defendants that is included twice in the U.S. Constitution.1 67 Although
there is significant overlap in the language of the U.S. Bill of Rights and
the Rome Statute on other matters-such as the right to a speedy and

164. Harold Hongju Koh, America's Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 111, 136 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).

165. ICC Hearing, supra note 107, at 10 (prepared statement of Sen. John Ashcroft), 6668 (prepared statement of Lee A. Casey, Attorney, Hunton & Williams, Wash., D.C.)
[hereinafter Casey statement].
166. See, e.g., American Servicemembers' Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7421(7) (2006)
(congressional finding that "[alny American prosecuted by the International Criminal Court
will, under the Rome Statute, be denied procedural protections to which all Americans are
entitled under the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution, such as the right to trial by
jury.").
167. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The trial of all Crimes, except in cases of
); amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; ....
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ).
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public trial;' 6 8 the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
charge;' 6 9 the right to examine adverse witnesses;17 0 the right to the
assistance of counsel;' 7 1 protection against self-incrimination;' 7 2
protection against warrantless or arbitrary arrest; 7 3 protection against
the use of illegally obtained evidence;174 and protection against double
jeopardy' 7 5 -it is true that the Rome Statute does not provide an exact
duplicate of the Bill of Rights guarantees.
But even if we accept as true the (perhaps overstated) proposition
that "the Rome Statute contains virtually every Constitutional right
afforded a citizen of the United States," 76 there is no guarantee that the
ICC will interpret these guarantees in ways that are consistent with
American constitutional law. In addition to the concern regarding the
lack of jury trials, commentators have questioned whether the ICC
would interpret the Rome Statute in ways that would satisfy American
constitutional standards in guaranteeing a speedy trial, 7 7 the right to
know the identity of hostile witnesses,' the right to reasonable bail,179
the right to the exclusion of hearsay evidence, o and even the right to
be protected from cruel and unusual punishment.!8 '
Defenders of the ICC have responded to these concerns in a variety
of ways. A commonly cited precedent is Neely v. Henkel, in which the
U.S. Supreme Court held that it was not unconstitutional for the United
States to extradite an American citizen for trial to a foreign jurisdiction
that does not provide the same criminal trial guarantees that are
included in the Bill of Rights.182 However, this is only a partial answer,
since Neely addresses only the situation where a crime is committed by
an American national on foreign soil. A more problematic concern is
that U.S. membership in the ICC would unquestionably result in the
Court having potential "jurisdiction over crimes committed by
168. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 67(1)(c).
169. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 67(1)(a).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 67(1)(e).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Rome Statute, supra note 12, arts. 55(2)(c)-(d), 67(1)(b), (d).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Rome Statute, supra note 12, arts. 55(1)(a), 55(2)(b),
67(1)(g).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Rome Statute, supra note 12, arts. 55(1)(d), 58-59.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 69(7).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 20.
176. Sasha Markovic, The Modern Version of The Shot Heard 'Round the World:
America's Flawed Revolution Against the International Criminal Court and the Rest of the
World, 51 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 263, 291 (2004).
177. Casey statement, supra note 165, at 68; Voigt, supra note 81, at 622.
178. Casey statement, supra note 165, at 67; Voigt, supra note 81, at 622.
179. Voigt, supra note 81, at 622.
180. Casey statement, supra note 165, at 67; Voigt, supra note 81, at 622.
181. Voigt, supra note 81, at 622.
182. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901).
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Americans against other Americans in the United States."l 8 3 Neely is,
admittedly, only a satisfactory answer to the possibility of an American
national committing an extraterritorial ICC crime.' 84
In another approach, proponents of U.S. membership in the Court
have analogized ICC crimes to crimes of terrorism in that both types of
crime are "affronts to humanity" characterized by "wanton disregard for
human life."' It has therefore been argued that an ICC trial-deficient
though it may be in guaranteeing some Bill of Rights provisions-may
be analogous to the U.S. military tribunals that were instituted by the
Bush administration to judge foreign terrorism suspects, which also do
not provide jury trials and complete Bill of Rights protections for
defendants.' 8 "By comparison," it has been argued, "a trial by the ICC
is far more respectful of a defendant's Constitutional rights then [sic] a
military tribunal." 87 This analogy is untenable, primarily because it
attempts to prove the constitutionality of the ICC by recourse to a
procedure that itself is of questionable constitutionality.1 8 8 The
argument also provides no solution that Neely does not already provide:
it is relatively uncontroversial that the Bill of Rights does not apply
when Americans (or non-Americans) are prosecuted before non-U.S.
tribunals for crimes committed outside the United States. The real
reason the ICC may be unconstitutional is that it would have the effect
of withholding trial by jury from an American national who commits an
ICC crime on American territory.'8 9 None of the Bush administration's
183. Casey statement, supranote 165, at 68.
184. Seguin, supra note 85, at 108.
185. Markovic, supranote 176, at 296.
186. Id. at 295-96.
187. Id. at 296.
188. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that certain provisions of the statute that established
the military commissions are unconstitutional: Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). For a
discussion of this case's implications for the law regarding the extraterritorial application of the
U.S. Constitution, see Gerald L. Neuman, The ExtraterritorialConstitution After Boumediene v.
Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009).
189. In a 1995 article, when the consensus that an international criminal court should be
created was just beginning to emerge at the United Nations, one commentator suggested that the
answer to this constitutional problem would likely be that "[v]irtually all the crimes that an
international criminal court would try already fall within the concurrent jurisdiction of one or
more foreign states, and thus are already subject to trial outside the United States under existing
principles of jurisdiction;" therefore, based on the Neely principle, the Constitution would not be
violated by allowing a non-U.S. tribunal to prosecute: Marquardt, supra note 153, at 118.
However, this approach assumed that an international criminal court would be based on a theory
of universal jurisdiction over serious international crimes. Largely as a result of U.S. resistance
at the Rome Conference, the Rome Statute was not written to confer universal jurisdiction for
crimes. Rather, it confers jurisdiction based on territoriality, nationality, and/or S.C. referral. It
remains true that "virtually all the crimes" that the ICC will try will not pose constitutional
problems for the United States, but what remains is a real theoretical problem relating to crimes
for which the United States would be the only state to have jurisdiction under the Statute.
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military tribunals judged criminal acts committed within the United
States by American nationals.
The fact that the ICC could have jurisdiction over American
nationals for crimes committed within the United States raises the
second major constitutional objection to the Rome Statute: that the
Constitution does not allow the federal judicial power to be transferred
to an "extra-constitutional institution."' 90 The judicial power of the
United States is vested in the Supreme Court and other inferior Courts
established by Congress.19' Any other tribunal established by Congress
is inferior to the Supreme Court. 192 Opponents of the ICC argue that
because any institution that is not a court of the United States may not
constitutionally exercise the judicial power,' 9 3 the ICC could not
constitutionally have jurisdiction over a crime committed within the
United States. Radical treaty implementation legislation enacted by
Congress that designated the ICC as an inferior court of the United
States would not solve this constitutional dilemma, because doing so
would obviously result in the Bill of Rights applying to the ICC. This in
turn would rejuvenate the constitutional objection that the ICC does not
provide for trial by jury.
Typically, when constitutional problems with multilateral treaties
arise, a simple "work around" is readily available to the United States:
the declaration of a treaty reservation. Numerous treaties that have been
ratified by the United States were ratified by the Senate subject to a
reservation that the United States accepts the treaty with the proviso that
the treaty only applies to the United States in ways that are consistent
with the U.S. Constitution.' 94 However, this solution is not available in
190. Casey statement, supra note 165, at 65.
191. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.").
192. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (indicating that one of the powers of Congress is "[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court").
193. Casey statement, supra note 165, at 65 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866)).
194. For example, a U.S. reservation relating to the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10020, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, states that
the United States considers itselfs [sic] bound by the obligation under Article
16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," only
insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"
means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by
the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
136 CONG. REC. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
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this case, since the Rome Statute explicitly prohibits any reservations
being made to the Statute.19 5
It has recently been suggested that the United States could ratify the
Rome Statute and do so subject to a number of "declarations,
understandings, and provisos" attached to the ratification by the
Senate,'9 including one that sets out the position that U.S. ratification is
not intended to mean that the Rome Statute requires the United States to
do anything "that is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution as interpreted
by the United States." 97 This is an innovative suggestion, but
unfortunately it appears to be little more than a word game whereby the
restriction on reservations to the Statute would be circumvented through
the use of slightly different terminology. The availability of such a
procedure cannot have been the intent of those who drafted the Statute,
and although a limited number of ICC member states have adopted the
approach, these "declarations" are of questionable legality.19 In any
case, it is difficult to integrate this strategy within a principled approach
to international law and the Rome Statute.
We are therefore left with the following proposition: since the ICC
does not provide for jury trials, the inevitable result is that the ICC
would be unconstitutional if it assumed jurisdiction over an American
national who committed crimes within the territory of the United States.
The fact that the Rome Statute, if ratified, would constitute part of the
"supreme Law of the Land" 9 9 would not affect this outcome: the
Supreme Court has held that the treaty-making power expressed in the
Constitution is not unlimited, and "it would not be contended that it
extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids." 200 In short,
absent a constitutional amendment, the United States cannot
constitutionally ratify a treaty that abrogates the Bill of Rights as it
applies to American criminal defendants who commit crimes in the
territory of the United States.
The conclusion that the Rome Statute is unconstitutional, although it
appears to be inescapable, does not mean that the United States could
never ratify the Rome Statute. From a practical standpoint, nothing is
unconstitutional until the U.S. courts declare it to be so, and no U.S.
court could prospectively declare the Rome Statute unconstitutional and
thereby prevent ratification. Indeed, in many ways, the constitutional
195. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 120.
196. David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminalCourt,98 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 1059-64 (2008).
197. Id. at 1061.
198.

WILLAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

372-74 (3d ed. 2007).
199. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
200. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
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arguments against the Statute are entirely theoretical, because as
discussed in Part IV.A above, it is unlikely that the ICC would assume
jurisdiction over any case involving an American national, let alone an
American national who committed crimes in the territory of the United
States. It is also possible that the Rome Statute will in the future be
amended in ways that will eliminate the constitutional difficulties for

the United States. 20 1
Nevertheless, the constitutional problems with the ICC, though
largely theoretical, are not to be lightly dismissed.2 0 2 Members of the
U.S. Senate, the body that must ratify treaties signed by the
executive,203 are "bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support th[e]
Constitution."204 No senator of either major party would contend that
his allegiance to any other principle would trump his or her obligation
under this oath, even if the competing principle includes the laudable
goal of providing international justice to the "victims of unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity" 205 and thereby
putting "an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes." 206 in
adhering to a difficult-to-amend foundational document that was
designed over two centuries ago, the United States exchanges limited
government and a relatively scrupulous protection of individual rights
for the ability to flexibly and comfortably participate in multilateral
organizations designed for the globalized world of the twenty-first
century. But American politicians are unlikely to apologize for making
this choice: if the members of the Senate realize that ratification of the
Rome Statute could act to unconstitutionally deny the right to trial by
jury to an American national who commits a crime in the United States,
201. For example, an amendment that required the consent of the state with territorial
jurisdiction over the crime in order to prosecute would probably solve the problem completely:
if the United States ratified such an amended Statute, it could prevent the ICC from ever
assuming jurisdiction over a case involving an American national (or anyone else) who commits
a crime in the United States. Potential jurisdiction over American nationals who commit
extraterritorial crimes would be constitutionally valid under Neely. An amendment to the Rome
Statute that repealed the prohibition on reservations being made to the treaty would also
eliminate the constitutional bar to U.S. ratification.
202. On the question of technical constitutional arguments, one commentator has stated:
"It is not to be disputed that United States cooperation with an international criminal court is
properly subject to constitutional scrutiny. The level of this scrutiny, however, ought to be a
macro level of constitutional values, and not some technical aspects of American constitutional
criminal procedure." Ilia B. Levitine, ConstitutionalAspects of an InternationalCriminal Court,
N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 27, 47 (1996). I do not disagree with this comment as a general statement of
sentiment, but I do find it impossible in this case to regard the right to trial by jury as one of the
"technical aspects of American constitutional criminal procedure" that can be safely ignored.
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
204. Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
205. Rome Statute, supra note 12, pmbl. para. 2.
206. Id. pmbl. para. 5.
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the Statute's ratification status will be just as Senator Jesse Helms
originally declared it would be in 1998: "dead-on-arrival."2 0 7

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION FOR THE OBAMA

ADMINISTRATION

It is understandable that the country with the largest extraterritorial
military presence in the world 208 would harbor some concerns regarding
the reach and power of an international criminal court. The central
objection of most American opponents of the ICC is the potential
criminal investigation or prosecution of an American national: most
other concerns are derivative or supplemental to this overarching
concern. There is little reason to believe that the ICC will ever attempt
to prosecute an American national for genocide, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes. Opposition to the ICC during the first term of
the Bush administration was intense, but that period will represent the
high-water mark of U.S. hostility to the Court. Signs of modulation and
even cooperation began to emerge in the second Bush term, and
continued rapprochement with the ICC seems likely under the Obama
administration. But how far should the new administration go in its
engagement with the Court?
First, if it has not already done so privately, the Obama
administration should take the question of whether or not the United
States will ultimately ratify the Rome Statute off the table. This should
be done for reasons both theoretical and practical: theoretical because
ratification of the Rome Statute would be unconstitutional, and practical
because at this stage, the ICC lacks any substantial support in the Senate
and ratification would not be politically achievable for the foreseeable
future. But as it adopts a course of gradual re-engagement, as described
below, the Obama administration need not publicly announce that
ratification is not an option: doing so would have counterproductive

207. Barbara Crossette, Helms Vows to Make War on UN. Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1998, at A9.
208. At the end of 2009, there were around half a million active duty personnel from the
U.S. military serving outside of American territory. This number includes 52,440 in Germany;
141 in the former Soviet Union; 25,447 in the rest of Europe; 35,688 in Japan; 151,000 in and
around Iraq; 71,000 in and around Afghanistan; 16,265 in the rest of Asia, Africa, and the
Pacific; 1,941 in Western Hemisphere; and 152,148 afloat in international waters or temporarily
ashore in a foreign country. Dep't of Defence, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by
Regional Area and by Country (Dec. 31, 2009), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mill
personnel/MILITARY/history/hstO9l2.pdf. Updated numbers for South Korea were not
available but at the end of 2008 amounted to 24,655. Dep't of Defence, Active Duty Military
Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://
siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0812.pdf.
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effects on the international goodwill that is likely to be generated by the
other steps the administration can take.
Second, now that the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute
has resulted in amendments that prohibit the Court from exercising
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression for nationals of non-ICC states,
the Obama administration should begin considering all forms of
engagement with the ICC that are short of ratification. Such means of
assistance could vary tremendously in their nature. Intangible
assistance, such as the use of official statements from the President and
other government officials to express support for the ICC and place
diplomatic pressure on other states to cooperate with the Court are a
logical first step. Such means of assistance cannot reasonably be
criticized as being contrary to ASPA and would be legitimate forms of
promoting the administration's foreign policy strategy.
As public and political support for the ICC grows, the Obama
administration may then consider more tangible forms of assistance,
such as the sharing of classified national security information with the
Court. While some will argue that such assistance would violate ASPA,
as long as the Court is not investigating or prosecuting American
nationals, tangible assistance can be legally justified by the saving
provision of ASPA, which allows the United States to provide
foreign nationals to justice for the alleged
assistance in- bringing
21
commission of international crimes. 209
At the same time, the administration could quietly make it clear to
the ICC and its member states that any investigation of situations
involving American nationals will result in the termination of American
support for the ICC. In time, complete repeal of ASPA could be
considered, though it may be useful to retain if the administration
interprets ASPA as only preventing cooperation in investigations and
prosecutions of American nationals. In this way, the retention of ASPA
could act as a potent reminder to the ICC that American support for the
Court remains targeted and finite.
Submitting the Rome Statute to the Senate should not be an option
for the Obama administration, but what should the administration do
about the Bush administration's "withdrawal" of the United States's
signing of the treaty? With ratification off the table, such a decision
would have purely symbolic significance, but it could be one with
considerable potency. President Obama cannot "re-sign" the Statute
anew, since the document was closed for signature after December 31,
209. 22 U.S.C. § 7433 (2006) ("Nothing in [ASPA] shall prohibit the United States from
rendering assistance to international efforts to bring to justice Saddan Hussein, Slobodan
Milosovic [sic], Osama bin Laden, other members of Al Queda, leaders of Islamic Jihad, and
other foreign nationals accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.").
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2000,210 and any state that did not sign the document can only join the

ICC through accession.211 However, it would be open to the Obama
administration to "withdraw the withdrawal" of the American signature.
Such an action would be of dubious legality, but no more so than the
original withdrawal was: if it was legal for the United States to
withdraw its signature, there is no reason that it should not also be
possible for the United States to withdraw the withdrawal. The Obama
administration could accompany such an act with a statement that it is
doing so to indicate its intention to support and cooperate with the
Court. Such an action would generate a tremendous amount of goodwill
among the 111ICC member states and would be a significant step in
restoring the U.S. State Department to its traditional role of leading the
global movement that promotes human rights and international justice.
VI. CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most notable achievement of the International Criminal
Court during the eight years in which it has existed has been its
demonstrated ability to function reasonably well in spite of the
opposition of the U.S. government. Before the ICC came into existence,
it was common for both supporters 2 12 and opponentS213 of the Court to
suggest that American support was vital to the Court's survival and
success. While it is still too early to make a definitive determination on
the effectiveness of the ICC, there is no doubt that the Court will
survive without U.S. support. The ICC is here to stay, whether the
United States likes it or not.
In its current form, the ICC poses little threat to American nationals
or to the vital national interests of the United States. Ratification of the
Rome Statute would be incompatible with the U.S. Constitution, but the
ICC encourages and accepts cooperation from member and nonmember states alike. Now that the 2010 Review Conference of the
Rome Statute has resulted in amendments that have provided the United
States with a crime of aggression opt-out, the Obama administration
should begin the implementation of a deliberately measured strategy of
engagement and cooperation with the ICC. The level and degree of
cooperation should steadily increase as American politicians and the

210. Rome Statute, supranote 12, art. 125(1).
211. Id, art. 125(3).
212. See, e.g., Michelle Sieff, World Needs a Crimes Court, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR

(Boston), Mar. 15, 2001, at 9.
213. See, e.g., Bolton, supranote 46, at 202.
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U.S. public begin to recognize that the ICC is not an internationalist
Trojan horse designed to breach the "American citadel."2 14
This "middle way" approach to the ICC--continued nonmembership accompanied by cooperation and support-may or may not
eventually result in U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute, but ultimately
such a question is all but irrelevant. As a proponent of "pragmatic
idealism," President Obama may be a leader who will recognize that
there is much that the United States can do as a non-member of the ICC
to simultaneously contribute to the Court's important work and protect
the national interests of the United States. He may well appreciate what
both supporters and opponents of the ICC have not: that an American
decision to participate in the pursuit of international justice should not
be constrained by the limited considerations of a false dilemma. 2 15

214. Id. at 193.
215. For further discussion, see also Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and its
Implication for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215 (2002).
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